We examined the relationship between national identification and anti-immigrant prejudice in a multilevel analysis of ISSP survey data from 37030 individuals in 31 countries. It is argued that this relationship depends on how national groups are defined by their members. Across the 31 national samples, the correlation between national identification and prejudice ranged from weakly negative (-.06) to moderately positive (+.37). The relationship was significantly stronger in countries where people on average endorsed a definition of national belonging based on language, and weaker where people on average define the nation in terms of citizenship. These effects occurred at a national rather than individual level, supporting an explanation in terms of the construction of nationality that prevails in a given context. Endorsement of the ancestry-based criteria for nationality was positively associated with prejudice, but only at the individual level.
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The topic of immigration has been receiving increasing interest from social scientists over the past decade. This is not surprising given the considerable number of people who are now migrating across international borders (Global Commission on International Migration, 2005) , and the consequent importance of immigration as a political issue in many countries. The range of possible reactions to immigration among the populations of receiving countries lends itself to evaluating and refining theories of prejudice and intergroup relations.
The fact that migration is a truly global phenomenon, with many different countries across every continent now receiving international migrants, presents the social scientist with the possibility of cross-national comparisons. It allows us to examine both consistency and variability in the psychological processes driving people's reactions to immigration, since these occur in national contexts with diverse economic conditions, histories of immigration, conceptions of nationality, and so forth. Such comparisons have highlighted some remarkable consistency in the correlates of anti-immigrant prejudice across national contexts, with factors such as economic deprivation, lack of contact with immigrants, perceived threat and political conservatism consistently predicting opposition to immigration (Pettigrew, Wagner, and Christ in press). However, the focus of the current paper is on the variability.
Specifically, we seek to demonstrate that, although national identification is often associated with anti-immigrant prejudice, there is variability in the relationship, and that this variability is partially accounted for by the various ways in which nations are defined.
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Nationalism is of interest across several disciplines, including history, political science and sociology, especially since Gellner (1983 Gellner ( /2006 ) and Anderson's (1983 Anderson's ( /1991 seminal contributions. It has been conceptualized in various ways, for example as the principle that nationhood and statehood should be congruent, or the project of actualising national unity, sovereignty and identity that follows from this principle (Gellner 1983 (Gellner /2006 Hobsbawm 1990 Hobsbawm /1992 Ignatieff 1993; Smith 2001) . Greenfeld (1996) understands nationalism as culture, in the sense of a shared representation of ideal social relations, in which the nation is envisaged as the basic source of sovereignty and object of solidarity.
The main concern for psychologists is usually individuals' identification with a national group that they belong to (e.g. Mummendey, Klink, and Brown 2001) .
Thus, psychologists tend to take the existence of nations for granted (for critiques see: Billig 1995; Reicher and Hopkins 2001) , and to consider them as one of the many group memberships that people have. This is in contrast to scholars in other disciplines, who have focused more on the unique qualities of nationalism by tracing its emergence as a political principle (Gellner 1983 (Gellner /2006 , or examining the primary importance of nationalism as the cultural underpinning of other elements of modernity, such as bureaucratic government (i.e. the state), capitalism and science (Greenfeld 1996; 2006) . These approaches can be complimentary, and the difference stems from the respective focus of each discipline rather than any actual disagreement about the nature of nationalism. Social psychologists focus on the meaning that a given social reality has for the individual, and the processes through which individuals shape and are shaped by the social world (Allport 1954a) . While noting the historical contingency of the nation and the nation-state, we can also acknowledge that nations
NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION AND ANTI-IMMIGRANT PREJUDICE
5 have a reality for the individual. An account of the social identity processes that operate within this reality is important if we are to understand, for example, the implications of identifying with a national group for one's attitudes towards immigrants. Nevertheless, we should remain aware that social identities have particular meanings that derive from the wider context (Reicher and Hopkins 2001) .
It is still unclear how ingroup identification in general is related to prejudice, even though this has been of interest to social scientists for over 100 years (Allport 1954b; Brewer 1999; Brown and Zagefka 2005; Sumner 1906 ). Social identity theory could be read to imply that ingroup identification should be associated with higher levels of prejudice, since outgroup derogation is means of achieving positive distinctiveness for the ingroup (Tajfel and Turner 1979) . However, intergroup bias resulting from the motive for positive ingroup distinctiveness is not the same as actual negativity towards an outgroup, which social identity theory is less able to explain (Brown 2000) . Reicher and Hopkins (2001) , meanwhile, criticize any attempt to establish a generic relationship between ingroup identification and prejudice as misguided, since it ignores the particular definitions and content of social identities. Jackson, Brown, Brown and Marks (2001) suggest that a positive relationship between national identification and negative attitudes towards immigrants might be expected because people who identify with the nation have a greater concern for the national interest. This is problematic because it assumes that immigration is inevitably perceived as bad for national interest.
Empirical evidence on the national identification-prejudice relationship is mixed. On the one hand, a number of studies conducted in various national contexts indicate a positive relationship between national identification and negative attitudes towards immigrants (Bourhis and Dayan 2004; Pettigrew 2006b; Pettigrew, Wagner, NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION AND ANTI-IMMIGRANT PREJUDICE 6 and Christ in press; Verkuyten 2004). However, Jackson et al. (2001) 
National definitions and the identification-prejudice relationship
It is possible to make sense of this apparently complex picture by considering the fact that nationhood is not represented in the same way in all countries. Depending on whether or not national group membership is defined in a way that excludes immigrants, we can expect national identification and attitudes towards immigrants to relate differently. Where the shared meaning of nationality is potentially inclusive of immigrants, there is no incompatibility between national identification and openness to immigrants. In such cases, there is no reason to expect national identification to be correlated with prejudice towards them. However, where nationhood is commonly understood in an exclusive way, national identification implies opposition to immigration, so should be correlated with prejudice. Therefore, the relationship between national identification and prejudice depends on the definition of nationality that prevails in a given context.
NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION AND ANTI-IMMIGRANT PREJUDICE
7
In the study of nationalism, a common distinction is made between ethnic and civic nationalism, whereby ethnic nationalism defines the nation in terms of some supposed shared ancestral, linguistic and/or cultural homogeneity and distinctiveness.
Civic nationalism on the other hand defines nationality in more voluntaristic terms, using criteria such as citizenship, as well as the institutional commitments and participation that this entails (Smith, 2001) . To define the national group is to define the bounds of collective sovereignty and equality, so national definitions have immense political significance (Greenfeld 2006) . Therefore, within ethnic nationalism, but not civic nationalism, nationality is defined in such a way that immigrants are excluded.
According to Hobsbawm (1990 Hobsbawm ( /1992 A further distinction can be drawn between a strictly 'ethnic' understanding of nationality based on ancestry, and a more 'cultural' definition based on criteria such as language (Shulman 2002 However, Maddens et al.'s (2000) evidence is insufficient for two reasons.
Firstly, the 'national identification' measure used in the study actually consisted mainly of participants' preferences for political decision-making and governance at either the Belgian or regional level. It therefore presented a forced choice between national and sub-national categories and was not a true measure of national identification. Secondly, with only two macro-level units (Flanders and Wallonia) the conclusion that the difference between them is due to differences in the social representations, rather than any other possible difference between the sub-national units, is speculative.
Stronger evidence is provided by Weldon's (2006) analysis of tolerance and citizenship regimes using survey data from all EU member states in 1997.
Respondents' identification with their nation state rather than Europe was found to be related to low political and cultural tolerance towards minority groups only in states with citizenship policies that are based on ethnic criteria. The study therefore provides compelling evidence for the moderation of the identification-prejudice relationship by citizenship regimes.
However, there are also some limitations to the conclusions that can be drawn from Weldon's (2006) analysis. As with Maddens et al. (2000) , the national identification measure forces respondents to choose between two objects of identification, in this case between the nation-state and Europe. Using such a measure, identification with the nation cannot be distinguished from dis-identification with Europe, which is not necessarily the same thing. showing that national identification is associated with negative feelings and intentions towards asylum seekers, but only to the extent that participants endorse an essentialist ('ethnic') definition of the nation group. Among the individuals who reject this definition, no relationship is observed. Therefore, national groups can be defined differently among individuals within the same country, and these differences appear to influence the identification-prejudice relationship.
The current study
We seek to show that the definition of nationality that is generally endorsed in one's country moderates the relationship between identification and prejudice, above and beyond effects of what one actually endorses as an individual. This is an important conceptual distinction, since it concerns the issue of whether a genuinely collective process, rather than the aggregation of individual processes, is involved. It is also distinction that can be made empirically using appropriate methodology.
In order to address this issue, we make use of representative survey data from 31 countries. This allows us to examine the relationship between national identification and anti-immigrant prejudice in each country. The dataset is well suited to a multilevel analysis of how the individual-level relationship between national identification and prejudice varies across the national samples, and accounting for this variability in terms of the differences between countries in the representations of national group membership. Such a multilevel approach to the topic is valuable because, on a theoretical level, both individual and broader societal level processes are of interest to psychologists studying prejudice (Allport 1954b) , and antiimmigrant prejudice in particular (Pettigrew 2006b) . Multilevel statistics allow us to model both kinds of process simultaneously and, crucially, to analyse how individuallevel relationships are moderated by societal or institutional factors. Pettigrew (2006a) asserts that multilevel statistics should become an essential tool for systematically contextualising psychological findings on prejudice, which is precisely the aim of the current research.
Other multilevel analyses of survey data on attitudes about immigration have found that, for example, the role of contact in reducing prejudice towards migrants appears to be most critical in countries with a high proportion of foreign nationals in the population (McLaren 2003) . Coenders and Scheepers (2003) the responses that were required for the analysis (5.5 percent), and those who were not citizens of the country in which the survey was carried out (2.6 percent), the total sample size was 37,030. National sample sizes were between 412 and 2,181.
Measures
Anti-immigrant prejudice was computed as the mean of 6 items tapping a negative perception of immigrants. Five of these were rated on a 5-point scale indicating agreement from 'agree strongly' to 'disagree strongly'. Missing values for education (11.6 percent) and income (15.4 percent) were imputed from observed values of the other independent variables using regression imputation.
This was done separately within each national sample. Carpenter and Kenward (2005) note that regression coefficients based on such imputed values can be misleading, and we suggest caution in interpreting the coefficients for these two variables. Our concern here was to avoid spurious relationships between the main variables of interest by controlling for the possible effects of age, education and income in our analysis. For a more comprehensive examination of the relationship between education and prejudice, we refer the reader to Coenders and Scheepers (2003) . 
National identification
RESULTS
Strength of the national identification-prejudice association
2 The other criteria that respondents were asked about (not used in the current analysis) were being born in the country, living most of ones life in the country, religion, respecting institutions, and feeling [nationality]. The overall score across all dimensions was 3.15.
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The simple correlation coefficients between national identification and prejudice give an indication of the variation in this relationship across the 31 national samples (table   1) . A significant positive relationship was observed in 18 countries. The strongest positive relationships were observed in Switzerland, West Germany and Denmark, where the correlation was moderate. Negative correlations were observed in Venezuela and Canada, but these were both very small, and reached significance only in Venezuela. The median identification-prejudice correlation was .13. Therefore, the relationship between national identification and prejudice ranged from a very weak negative relationship to a moderate positive relationship, with a weak positive relationship on average.
Overall correlations between national identification, prejudice and the national definitions at both individual and national levels are shown in table 2. It is apparent that the relationships between these variables differ at individual and nation levels of analysis. For example, national identification and all three definitions are positively related to prejudice at the individual level, while at the national level, both national identification and the civic definition are negatively related to prejudice.
[TABLES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE]
Accounting for the variation in the identification-prejudice relationship using multilevel regression
In order to test our hypothesis that the identification-prejudice relationship depends on national level differences in the construal of nationality we carried out multilevel regression analysis using HLM 6 (Raudenbush, Bryk, and Congdon 2007) . This makes it possible to analyse variance at both individual and national levels within a single model, and to test our hypothesized nation-level moderation of individual-level relationships.
National identification and the definition variables were all centred at the grand mean. In multilevel regression, centering is essential if we are to be able to interpret the variance in the slope between groups, as well as the path coefficients for any variable involved in cross-level interactions. This is because the values obtained are those estimated when all other parameters are equal to zero (Hox 2002) . Zero must therefore be a meaningful value. Grand mean centering makes zero the mean of the variable. Education and income were centred at the national mean (rather than the overall mean) because these variables were not involved in interactions, had fixed slopes, and were considered to be more meaningful in relation to co-nationals than in relation to the entire dataset.
[
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
In total, 5 predictive models plus one null model were estimated (table 3) .
3
The null model consisted only of an intercept and error terms for the individual level 3 The model reported here was un-weighted, meaning that the model gives equal weight to each individual case rather than each country. Weighting at level one, such that each country has equal influence on the analysis regardless of sample size, yields the same pattern of results. In model 1, we added the demographic control variables (age, education and family income) and GDP at the national level. These significantly decreased the deviance statistic, indicating an improvement in the fit of the model. The beta estimates indicated that older respondents reported significantly more prejudice than younger respondents, and that education and family income both had a significant negative relationship with prejudice.
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In model 2 we added national identification at both the individual and national levels. These further improved the fit of the model. The beta values indicated that, at the individual level, national identification had a weak positive overall relationship with anti-immigrant prejudice. However, at the national level, the relationship is 4 Because variance is modelled at two levels (within and between national samples), we obtain separate R 2 values for each level. These can be used to evaluate how much variance is explained at each level by each model. A total R 2 statistic is derived from these, which indicates the overall variance explained by the model (Hox, 2002) . It should be noted these are estimates. They therefore do not carry the same weight that they do in traditional multiple regression, but are useful interpretative tools.
negative. That is, people in countries with high mean levels of identification reported
lower levels of prejudice.
In model 3, we added the national definition variables (citizenship, language and ancestry definitions) at both individual and national levels. These again improved the fit of the model. At the individual level, citizenship and ancestry definitions were positively associated with prejudice, although the relationship for citizenship was very weak. At the national level prejudice was negatively associated with the citizenship definition.
In model 4, we added the three terms representing the interaction between national identification and each national definition variable at the individual level.
GDP was also added as a national-level predictor of the identification-prejudice slope. The ancestry definition did not moderate the slope as we had expected.
DISCUSSION
As predicted, national level differences in national definitions do account for variation between countries in the national identification-prejudice relationship.
National identification predicts prejudice most positively in those countries in which people on average regard speaking the national language as more important, and citizenship as less important, as criteria for being considered a national of that country. The relationship is also more positive in countries with higher GDP.
Furthermore, the multilevel method allows us to conclude that these contextual effects genuinely occur at a collective level. They are not a consequence of aggregated individual level effects. Indeed, the individual level interaction terms are negligible in magnitude. In other words, the identification-prejudice relationship depends on being in a nation in which these criteria are generally considered important, rather than being an individual for whom they are important. Moreover, the fact that the definitions moderate in different directions confirms that the results cannot be explained away in terms of national differences in response bias (Smith 2004) .
At the individual level, support for the ethnic criterion showed a moderate positive association with prejudice, confirming existing findings (Rothi et al. 2005 ).
The civic criterion had a weak positive relationship to prejudice. While this should be interpreted with consideration of the strong national-level effects of this dimension in the opposite direction, it confirms that endorsement of any of the criteria involves
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21 some level of exclusivity (Green 2007) . Individuals with lower income and less education than their co-nationals are more prejudiced, in line with previous findings (Pettigrew 2006b) , although these relationships are also weak.
The results are consistent with our central argument that there is no generic relationship between national identification and anti-immigrant prejudice, and that the relationship that is observed in any given context depends on how the nation is defined by the population. As we have seen, where nationality is understood in terms of citizenship, the identification-prejudice relationship is close to zero (and in some cases negative), but where it is understood in terms of language, the relationship is moderate and positive. This makes sense if one considers that nationalism calls for congruence between the national group and the state. Identification with a culturally defined nation implies opposition to immigration more strongly than identification with a nation defined by shared citizenship. The prevalence of these different kinds of national group construal varies across countries, and so the relationship between national identification and prejudice varies systematically with this.
This goes some way in clarifying the existing evidence on national identification and prejudice in the literature, which has until now been unclear (Jackson et al. 2001; Pettigrew, Wagner, and Christ in press) . It also informs the broader debate on the relationship between ingroup affiliations and prejudice (Allport 1954b; Brewer 1999; Brown and Zagefka 2005) , adding weight to the argument that the study of social identity processes should not be divorced from identity content (Livingstone and Haslam 2008; Reicher 2004; Reicher and Hopkins 2001) . The study demonstrates that the consequences of identifying with a group can be better understood by paying closer attention to the group definitions that dominate in any given context. In the case of nationality, these definitions are related to whether or not
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immigration constitutes subversion of the nation-state, and, by implication, whether or not individuals who identify with the national group are also hostile towards immigrants.
In addition to clarifying the relationship between identification and prejudice at the individual level, our analysis reveals that national identification is negatively associated with prejudice at the national level. This remains marginally significant when controlling for the national definition variables. Although not expected, this intriguing observation further undermines any assumption of a straightforward positive relationship between identifying with one's national group and hostility towards immigrants. It suggests that, although having a high level of national identification can be associated with higher levels of prejudice (depending on the contextual conditions described above), living in a country in which national identification on average is high has the opposite association. That is, having conationals who identify strongly with the nation is associated with having more tolerant attitudes towards immigrants.
We can speculate as to why this negative relationship occurs. One interpretation, for example, is in terms of threat. In contexts where levels of national identification are generally low, people may perceive national identity to be particularly vulnerable, with a consequent increase in the perception of identity threat associated with immigration. In countries with high average levels of national identification, on the other hand, people may perceive national identity to be secure, and therefore less sensitive to immigration as a threat to nationhood. While this is an interesting possibility, it should not be prematurely assumed that official attempts to increase overall national identification, even in an apparently inclusive way, would necessarily improve attitudes towards immigrants. Such efforts could actually do the Although further research is necessary to untangle this particular relationship, the finding does illustrate that relationships occurring between variables at the macrolevel, such as between countries, are often distinct from individual level relationships.
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In the case of the identification-prejudice relationship, the two levels actually show associations in opposite directions. Without analysing the variance at both levels simultaneously, this would not have been apparent, and we may have mistakenly extended the overall finding from the individual level to draw conclusions about national level phenomena. For example, we might have assumed that countries with high national identification are high in prejudice, when in fact the reverse is true. This is known as the 'compositional fallacy' (Pettigrew 2006a) , and the multilevel approach employed here is a powerful means to avoid it.
A further unpredicted finding is that national identification predicts prejudice more strongly in countries with high GDP than in those with low GDP. This is not surprising given that one can reasonably assume that wealthy countries are likely to be receiving immigrants who are relatively poor, compared to their own populations.
Immigrants are therefore more likely to be perceived as an economic burden rather than a benefit to the country. This would explain why national identification is more closely linked to anti-immigrant prejudice in wealthy countries.
Our analysis also clarifies the relationship between different national definitions. Civic and cultural/ethnic definitions of national group membership might appear in opposition to one another, such that a given national group defines itself in either one way or another. However, our data suggest that the importance of one kind
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of criteria does not appear to diminish the importance of others. This is not to negate the usefulness of understanding civic and ethnic nationalism as conceptually and historically distinct phenomena, but rather to note that these apparently contradictory ideal types are not fundamentally in conflict with one another at the level of popular attitudes.
Our finding that the support for the linguistic definition of nationality is associated with a stronger identification-prejudice relationship is interesting, given that language is not as clearly an inclusive or exclusive definition as citizenship and ancestry respectively. Brubaker (1990) suggests that cultural homogeneity can form part of a broadly civic nationalism. Giving the example of France, he argues that cultural unity can be construed as an expression of political unity, which is in contrast to its role in ethnic nationalism as a primordial basis for such unity. The point at which minority groups' cultural separateness is seen to violate political unity is precisely the point around which numerous debates are now taking place in several countries. The case of the French ban on religious symbols in public schools is one example.
The cultural definition of nationality (or at least 'language' as its proxy) shows a pattern more similar to what we would expect of 'ethnic' rather than 'civic' nationalism with regard to anti-immigrant prejudice in the current study. This is in line with Hobsbawm's (1990 Hobsbawm's ( /1992 
